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Abstract: Differences in governance relationships and community efforts to 
remove an exotic, rapidly spreading invasive plant, the-mile-a-minute weed 
(Mikania micrantha), are explored in five case study community forests in the 
subtropical region of Chitwan, Nepal. An institutional analysis informs an exami-
nation of the de jure (formal) versus de facto (on the ground) institutions and 
actor relationships relevant to Mikania removal efforts. Contrary to the expecta-
tions set by the de jure situation, we find heterogeneous governance relationships 
and norms related to Mikania management across community forests. Content 
analysis of interview data illuminates reoccurring themes and their implications 
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for social and ecological outcomes in the communities. Complex governance 
relationships and regular discussion of distrust of government and non-govern-
ment officials help explain collective action efforts and management decisions. 
The content analysis suggests that Mikania is impacting people’s daily lives but 
the degree of severity and the response to the disruption varies substantially and 
is affected by other problems experienced by community forest members. Our 
results indicate that understanding how the de facto, or on the ground situation, 
differs from the de jure institutions may be vital in structuring successful efforts 
to manage invasive species and understanding collective action problems related 
to other social-ecological threats. We present data-informed propositions about 
common pool resource management and invasive species. This study contributes 
to a better scientific understanding of how institutions mediate social-ecological 
challenges influencing common pool resources more broadly.
Keywords: Invasive species, common pool resources, community forestry, 
Nepal, collective action
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1. Introduction
1.1. Chitwan National Park, buffer zone community forests, and the  
mile-a-minute weed
Chitwan is a rapidly urbanizing district in Nepal’s subtropical Terai region con-
taining the internationally-important Chitwan National Park. Chitwan National 
Park was founded as Nepal’s first national park in 1973 (Straede and Helles 2000) 
and is home to high-profile species such as the Bengal tiger and one-horned 
rhinoceros. The park’s area is approximately 932 square kilometers (Nepal and 
Weber 1994) and in 1996 a formally recognized buffer zone of approximately 750 
square kilometers surrounding the park was created (Straede and Treue 2006). 
The purpose of establishing the buffer zone was to decrease the impact of human 
activity on the park ecosystem by creating rules on resource collection and use for 
people who live in these areas (Nepal and Weber 1994). Human impacts on the 
park are substantial: it is heavily visited, having hosted 115,181 visitors in fiscal 
year 2009–2010 (Pandit et al. 2015). Furthermore, the buffer zone area saw a net 
decrease of 62 square kilometers of forest and a net increase of 67 square kilome-
ters of agricultural land between 1978 and 1999 (Baidya et al. 2010).
Community forestry is a type of decentralized, local forest resource gover-
nance system. Community forest user groups were formally established in Nepal 
in 1993 through the Forest Act and were designed to address the challenges of peo-
ple, natural resources, and protected areas (Iversen et al. 2006; also see Gilmour 
2003 for an overview of community forestry and associated policies in Nepal). In 
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the mid-1990s, Chitwan gained its first formally-recognized community forests, 
most in the buffer zone. These community forests provided residents opportuni-
ties to collect forest products and timber in forests that are largely self-governed. 
The community forestry program also intended to reduce people’s reliance on 
often illegally harvested forest resources within the national park, while simul-
taneously supporting livelihoods through sustainable management of the buffer 
zone forests. However, novel social-ecological changes such as increasing rates of 
urbanization and biological invasions now threaten the success of the community 
forestry program in increasing and maintaining forest health. 
This research explores how institutions influence community forest members’ 
collective efforts to manage a rapidly spreading invasive plant, known infor-
mally as the mile-a-minute weed (Mikania micrantha: hereafter referred to as 
Mikania), that is disrupting social-ecological processes in this region. Institutions 
are defined in this research as the shared rules, norms, and strategies that shape 
human decision making and are inherently intertwined in efforts to govern com-
mon pool resources, such as community forests (Ostrom 2005). 
With this research, we address a gap in analyses of community forestry out-
comes (Lachapelle et al. 2004; Charnley and Poe 2007) by elucidating the impacts 
of governance relationships, or their absence, on collective action in a common 
pool resource facing social-ecological changes. Thus, our study contributes to 
scientific understanding of the relationship between institutional diversity and 
management efforts and illuminates the importance of learning the on-the-ground 
conditions, as opposed to solely studying the formal institutional situation. This 
research has practical significance as the findings can improve collective natu-
ral resource management, leading to enhanced efforts to mitigate the negative 
impacts of invasive species on ecologically significant species and socially and 
economically important protected areas. 
1.2. Mikania micrantha invasion as a social-ecological challenge 
Mikania micrantha is a fast-growing plant native to South America that favors 
humid, warm (tropical and subtropical) environments (Figure 1). Mikania is 
believed to have been intentionally transferred to India and the Pacific Islands 
around the 1940s for use as a cover crop for airfields (IUCN 2005). Since then it 
has negatively impacted agricultural and forest resources in parts of India, China, 
and Nepal, among other regions. Mikania spreads rapidly across landscapes 
through both vegetative growth from dropped stems and wind-borne seeds; it is 
fire-adapted and contains allelopathic compounds in its roots that inhibit growth 
of other plants. Household resource collection activities often result in uninten-
tional exacerbation of Mikania. Mikania is often entangled in collected grasses 
and grows where pieces are dropped along resource collection routes. For these 
reasons, it has proved to be extremely difficult to eradicate. In Chitwan, Mikania 
was present in 20% of Chitwan National Park in 2010 (Khadka 2010) but the 
buffer zone community forests have been invaded to differing degrees of severity 
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(Clark et al. 2016). Recent work has shown that Mikania invasion causes sig-
nificant ecological harm to local resources, including food and habitat for the 
vulnerable one-horned rhinoceros (Ram 2008; Murphy et al. 2013). By covering 
and killing vegetation, Mikania further represents a threat to the livelihoods of 
Chitwan households that are dependent on collecting grasses and fodder (Rai and 
Scarborough 2015). Many invasive plants globally have become useful to local 
communities after their invasion. Unfortunately, Mikania is not a viable substitute 
for the grasses it covers, which are often used to feed livestock by many Chitwan 
households, as Mikania is indigestible to most livestock.
Previous research and the fieldwork discussed in this article have found that 
efforts to manage Mikania in the buffer zone community forests have been largely 
unsuccessful (Murphy et al. 2013). When referring to “Mikania management,” we 
mean efforts by actors to address the Mikania invasion, primarily involving dif-
ferent removal attempts and discussion of or planning for such efforts. Removal 
attempts often include pulling, cutting, or burning the plant. In addition to study-
ing the ecological and biological aspects of the forests and Mikania (see Clark 
et al. 2016), to strengthen Mikania management, researchers and stakeholders 
need a clear understanding of the governance relationships across the buffer zone 
community forests. Without information about the actors involved in Mikania 
management efforts on the ground, stakeholders will continue to lack the informa-
Figure 1: Mikania micrantha climbing a tree in Chitwan. (Photo by the authors).
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tion necessary to successfully design or influence collective Mikania management 
efforts in Chitwan and elsewhere.  
1.3. Definitions and research questions
We use the term de jure (“by law”) to reflect the actors hypothetically involved 
in Mikania management in the buffer zone, or the situation as it formally exists 
via laws, policies, and records. We use the term de facto (“in fact”) to reflect the 
actors presently involved in Mikania management, determined via our fieldwork. 
To understand the de facto situation, we employ case studies in five community 
forests to explore the connections between the perceived effects of Mikania on 
livelihoods, the diversity in current Mikania management practices, and the rela-
tionship between these factors and existing institutions and governance relation-
ships. The term “governance relationship” refers to interactions between different 
actors (including government agencies at different levels, non-governmental orga-
nizations, community forest governance officials, and local community members) 
involved in a collective issue that results in the creation or reinforcement of insti-
tutions (Hufty 2011). 
In general, little is understood about the role that Mikania plays in affecting 
the everyday lives of the buffer zone community forest residents, how the buf-
fer zone community forest members interact with other actors regarding Mikania 
management, and the role of institutions in mediating threats to social-ecologi-
cal systems. To address these scientific and management gaps, we focus on the 
following:  
1) Based upon the de jure institutional arrangements, what actors should be 
involved in Mikania management and what does Mikania management 
resemble de facto, or on the ground?   
2) How do norms alter the de jure institutional arrangements and influence 
community forest user groups’ collective Mikania management activities?
3) What lessons can we learn from this case study of Mikania management 
to inform the role of institutions in mediating collective action problems 
involving social-ecological challenges?
1.4. Community forestry and institutional heterogeneity
Recent research from around the globe has focused on the various factors that lead 
to successful community forestry outcomes, including common property manage-
ment, power dynamics, and accountability (Agrawal and Chhatre 2006; Behera and 
Engel 2006). Despite this prior work in Nepal (Varughese and Ostrom 2001; Poteete 
and Ostrom 2004; Ojha 2006; Ojha et al. 2009), little is known about how different 
governance relationships between community forestry groups may mediate social-
ecological challenges like invasive species management (Epanchin-Niell et al. 
2009) or what this means for how institutional analysis may be most effectively 
conducted (i.e. studying the on the ground situation versus the formal situation).
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Community forestry often introduces decentralized, democratic governance 
where people within a given community contribute to decision making processes 
(Lachapelle et al. 2004). However, heterogeneity exists among institutions; some 
community forests target specific groups (including women or disadvantaged caste 
and ethnic groups) in an effort to right long-enduring discrimination, inequality, 
and injustice, and there are substantial differences in community forest manage-
ment practices or goals. Different institutional arrangements within Nepal appear 
to reflect underlying heterogeneity of the communities including the variation in 
biophysical condition of the forest (forest degradation/forest health), dominant 
labor occupation (community dependence on the forest resources and employ-
ment opportunities in nearby markets), and community dynamics and population 
size (Acharya 2002). 
Heterogeneity related to governance practices and management norms often 
exists within community forests in the same geographic region. Heterogeneity 
in caste, education, gender, and other factors influence which households benefit 
the most from community forestry and who participates in collective resource 
management (Adhikari 2005). Contrary to previous studies, richer households 
with land holdings, livestock, and more monetary resources are sometimes more 
dependent on community forest resources than poorer households, and thus are in 
a better position to benefit from intermediate forest products (Gilmour et al. 2004; 
Adhikari 2005). 
The role of heterogeneity in collective management of common pool 
resources has been hotly debated in the literature (Varughese and Ostrom 2001). 
Heterogeneity here refers to differences that might impact the success of reach-
ing a collective goal. Kant (2000) defined this heterogeneity in three levels: (1) if 
there are social, cultural, and economic differences between people living in the 
same area using the same resources, there are likely to be (2) different preferences 
for using the resources and (3) different preferences for management. Thus, het-
erogeneity hypothetically can pose difficulties in successful collective action to 
manage a common pool resource (Ostrom 2005). Ostrom (2005) argues that the 
focus on heterogeneity has been misplaced; instead the focus should be on the fac-
tors affecting differences in heterogeneity, such as the governance relationships, 
and interactions between factors. One factor that may influence heterogeneity in 
collective efforts to manage Mikania is trust between actors, such as community 
forest members, NGOs, and the national park. The idea that trust may influence 
heterogeneity is intuitive in common pool resource management, but there is a 
dearth of empirical and systematic studies of trust in the common pool resource 
literature (Ostrom 2010). Our analysis will contribute a systematic exploration of 
the role of trust in Mikania management efforts in Chitwan. 
Chitwan community forests formally have homogeneous structures: to be 
recognized by the government, they must create management and governance 
plans that are reviewed by the district forest office or, if the community forest 
borders the national park (as in all of our case studies), the plans are reviewed by 
the park office. These two offices have similar requirements, and thus the orga-
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nizations have created formally homogenous structures in the community forests 
in this area. Local community forest members are part of a community forest 
user group and each community forest has a locally elected governance com-
mittee, typically consisting of ten to fifteen members. Households are eligible 
to join an established user group based on their location within a community 
forest’s catchment area. These catchment areas are administrative boundaries 
that are determined by district and local level government (the latter known as 
the Village Development Committee). The community forest governance com-
mittees are responsible for carrying out rules and policies outlined in their own 
forest management plans. These plans can be altered by the governance commit-
tees, but they are largely similar across community forests and include policies 
such as fees (if any) for grass and fodder collection; membership fee structures; 
rules for removal of resources such as fuelwood and timber (which is typically 
prohibited due to the general scarcity of harvest-ready trees); and possible sanc-
tions for violating resource collection or use rules. Community forest members 
are informed of their committee’s policies when they join and are responsible for 
upholding the policies outlined in the management plan as well as informal norms 
such as aiding in activities like annual forest cleaning where trash is collected. 
Based on our fieldwork including a 2014 household survey of 21 community for-
ests in the buffer zone, membership of eligible households ranges from 38% in 
forests near urban areas to 93% elsewhere; over 80% of buffer zone households 
engage in some form of agriculture and thus many rely on the forest resources. 
Forest resources include grasses fed to dairy animals, like cows and buffalo, that 
are essential to agricultural households; these animals provide manure for crop 
fertilization and power for running agricultural machinery. Table 1 provides an 
overview of household characteristics for the five community forests presented 
as case studies in this article (see the methods section), and average measures for 
all 21 buffer zone communities for comparison. 
1.5. Formal rules (de jure) versus rules in use (de facto)
It is important to understand institutions as they exist formally, but entirely dif-
ferent and equally essential to understand how they operate in practice, the “rules 
in use” (Ostrom et al. 1994; Ostrom 2005, 186). Formally, as defined in forest 
management plans, the buffer zone community forest rules are very similar due to 
the aforementioned management plan procedures. Figure 2 details the actors that 
hypothetically, de jure, would be involved in some aspect of Mikania manage-
ment based on forestry acts or Nepal’s government structure. Our analysis will 
explore how the de facto situation, the way institutions are operationalized, dif-
fers from the de jure situation depicted in Figure 2 and why this matters. We ulti-
mately contribute three propositions based on our finding that the situations differ 
significantly – connecting governance relationships, common pool resources, 
and invasive plants – which lend insight into the role of institutions in mediating 
social-ecological challenges more generally.  
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1.6. Our study 
Using data from five case study community forests, we explore the relationship 
between governance, institutions, and invasive species management. We inves-
tigate the role of institutions as mediators of shocks and disruptive events that 
threaten community sustainability (Leach et al. 2010). In our setting, these disrup-
tions take the form of invasive plants as a threat to the social-ecological system. 
Institutions evolve over time and adapt to the social, political, economic, and 
ecological context in which they are embedded. When there are slow or gradual 
changes in this context, there is time and flexibility for institutions and relation-
ships to successfully adapt. Abrupt shocks, such as rapidly spreading invasive 
species, challenge these relationships and their sustainability (Young et al. 2006). 
Distinct from much community forestry literature, our focus is not on under-
standing collective action to establish community forestry programs (Varughese 
and Ostrom 2001; Poteete and Ostrom 2004), but rather on collectively acting 
to manage the forest in the face of potentially catastrophic social-ecological 
challenges like Mikania. An understanding of collective action on the ground is 
important for confronting such common pool resource threats (Ostrom 2005).  
Figure 2: Governance relationships involved in Mikania management in the buffer zone community 
forests in the de jure situation. Darker grey circles are local level actors, while lighter grey circles 
represent district or national level actors (non-governmental organizations – NGOs – are both).
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2. Methods
2.1. Case study selection and fieldwork
Five community forests were selected for household and management committee 
interviews from a group of 11 buffer zone community forests where ecological 
data, including Mikania distribution, was collected in 2013. To select case stud-
ies, we first created a preliminary “governance capacity” index (high, medium, or 
low) based upon historical data related to community forest income (government 
funds and money community forest governance committees raised via selling 
resources such as gravel to the government or tourist entry fees) and the commu-
nity forest’s age (time since establishment). The total amount of income available 
to a governance committee critically influences the community forest-related and 
social services the committee can provide for its members. For example, wealthier 
governance committees are able to hire guards to ensure forest resource collection 
rules are enforced, and they additionally often support other social services such 
as local schools and infrastructure improvements (like roads). The stratification 
process in our case selection ensured cases included a mixture of historically high, 
medium, and low governance capacities. After classifying all community forests, 
we used a random number generator to assign numbers to each case. The com-
munity forests corresponding to the two largest values in the high and low cat-
egories, and the largest value in the medium category, were selected. We adopted 
this methodology to reduce any personal biases (such as personal experience or 
learned information about specific communities) in selecting our cases and to 
increase the likelihood of variation in governance capacities. The five commu-
nity forests in this research are identified by pseudonyms (the names of rivers 
in Nepal) because some of the information discussed is sensitive to these small 
communities. 
In total we conducted 29 semi-structured small-group interviews with 87 
interviewees between May and July 2014. Our method is the most appropri-
ate way to understand the rules in use, as we are able to collect richer, more 
nuanced information than with other methods such as surveys. Five interviews 
were conducted in each community forest, which each included between two and 
ten participants. The remaining interviews took place in Chitwan National Park, 
two non-governmental organizations, and the buffer zone committee office. All 
interviews were between one and two hours in length. These interviews included 
questions covering interactions with a variety of individuals and organizations, 
Mikania management, and perceptions of Mikania; the semi-structured nature 
also allowed participants to discuss emergent topics (Bernard 2011). Before 
interviewing, the protocol was translated to Nepali by a native Nepali speaker 
and tested with several community members at the Institute for Social and 
Economic Research-Nepal (ISER-N) in Chitwan. Some concepts, such as “inva-
sive species” do not directly translate or have a meaning in Nepali. As such, 
translations were made to best approximate the intended meaning in English. 
Fieldwork additionally consisted of participant observation (of activities such as 
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fodder  collection) between and during interviews to more fully understand the 
contexts of the responses. 
2.2. Types of interviewees and interview structure
To explore governance relationships, we interviewed community forest members, 
the five governance committee presidents, Chitwan National Park officials, buf-
fer zone committee officials, and officials from two non-governmental organi-
zations. Figure 2 presented the de jure conceptual representation of the actors. 
The buffer-zone community forests are connected to the buffer zone committee, 
which generally acts as a mediator between the community forest governance 
committees and the national park. Most of the community forests in Chitwan are 
registered with either the district forest or Chitwan National Park; all of our case 
study forests except one were registered with Chitwan National Park (the remain-
ing community forest was restricting resource collection due to poor forest health 
and intended to register with the park in the future). 
The interviewee composition was representative of the ethnic composition 
and educational status of each of the community forests. It is possible that higher 
caste Hindus were underrepresented in the interviews and females were overrep-
resented. We under-represented young women (18–21 years) who were less likely 
to participate in an interview with males or older females present; additionally, 
there were fewer young men, as many were working overseas. We were able to 
interview both farmers and non-farmers, but it was very difficult to find people 
that did not farm in some capacity. Interviews with two non-governmental organi-
zations consisted of representatives from NGO A and NGO B (pseudonyms), both 
working in Chitwan and with some of the case studies. These non-governmental 
organizations are both conservation oriented and provide services to local house-
holds, such as wildlife and plant identification classes and habitat management 
information (for example, wetland management). Each non-governmental orga-
nization has worked with some local households on invasive plant management. 
2.3. Content analysis
Content analysis, also sometimes referred to as theme analysis, is a systematic text 
analysis method common in anthropology that is applicable in any research with 
text data. Content analysis can be both deductive, where the analyst begins with 
a hypothesis or an idea from the literature that they seek to assess, or inductive 
where codes stem from fieldwork and intimate knowledge of the data (Bernard 
2011). Content analysis can be quantitative or qualitative in nature. Some of our 
codes are quantitatively presented as percentages while others are discussed qual-
itatively in the context of participant observation notes or an entire interview. The 
codebook was developed according to best practices established by MacQueen 
et al. (1998). Two independent coders went through the codes together and calcu-
lated inter-rater reliability for each code in five interviews. Inter-rater reliability 
is a measure of agreement among coders; if all coders coded every instance of a 
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code the same, the Cohen’s kappa (the standard inter-rater reliability statistic of 
agreement) for that code would equal one, whereas if every instance was coded 
differently, Kappa would equal zero. In order to resolve codes where an initial 
kappa of 0.7 or greater was not achieved, we discussed the codes for clarification 
and re-coded (MacQueen et al. 1998). 
2.4. Institutional analysis 
Content and institutional analyses are natural complements for text data that 
explores governance relationships, as themes can be interpreted in the context of 
governance relationships. There are a wide variety of approaches to institutional 
analysis, but in many cases the Institutional Analysis and Development frame-
work provides a background to the interpretation of existing strategies, norms, 
and rules (Ostrom 2011). Here, we focus on the actors and the action situation 
within the framework (Figure 3) to explore linkages between governance relation-
ships. There are a variety of actors interacting with community forest user groups 
in some manner. The linkages between these actors, including the frequency and 
strength, are distinct in the five case studies. Coding the interview data for the 
presence of these relationships aided in clarifying them, but initial diagrams of 
governance relationships and norms of interactions were created during fieldwork 
for each case. The institutional analysis examines the text and participant observa-
tion notes for the relationships between the participants potentially involved in the 
action arena focused on Mikania management presented in Figures 2 and 3. These 
relationships impact how information about Mikania is communicated and will be 
discussed qualitatively in the context of the information from the content analy-
sis. Future research will elaborate on other areas of the framework in Figure 3, 
Figure 3: The Institutional Analysis and Development Framework, adapted from Ostrom 
et al. (1994).
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including linking biophysical conditions of the forests to the action situation and 
related outcomes. 
3. Results
3.1. Community forests are heterogeneous
Based on the similarity of most community forest management plans, we antici-
pated that the community forests would be similar in multiple aspects. In actuality, 
we discovered that across the five community forests heterogeneity in governance 
was the norm and that the de facto governance relationships (Figure 4) differ from 
the de jure situation (Figure 2). There is variation in the concern about Mikania, 
perceived extent and spread of Mikania within the forests, the physical methods 
used to manage Mikania, and organization of community members involved in 
management. Variation also exists in the major problems identified by each case 
study: invasive species, human-wildlife conflict, flooding, forest degradation, and 
pollution. There is substantial variation in community forest collaboration with 
outside entities, specifically non-governmental organizations and the national 
Figure 4: Governance relationships involved in Mikania management in the buffer zone commu-
nity forests in the de facto situation. Faded circles and lines (the lightest grey) represent actors 
and relationships formally present that do not exist, or are significantly weaker, in practice.
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park. Next, we elaborate on these variations and expand upon the importance and 
impact of this heterogeneity. 
3.2. Perceptions of Mikania and impact on daily lives
Most interviewees in all five communities believed that Mikania was increasing 
in abundance, while some thought Mikania presence in their forest was the same 
when compared to the previous year (Figure 5). Interviewees in Trishuli, Koshi, 
and Gandaki (particularly women, who are responsible for most resource collec-
tion) expressed that Mikania was impacting how they allotted their daily time, 
by making collection of forest resources such as grasses and fodder increasingly 
difficult. Interviewees in all five communities articulated that increasing Mikania 
abundance limits food sources for wildlife, resulting in additional large fauna 
(tigers, rhinos, boar) leaving the forest in search of food. 
3.3. Major problems identified in the community forests
There was substantial variation in the problems discussed by interviewees 
(Table 2). All interviewees were asked about flooding, issues experienced with 
wildlife (crop destruction, attacks, or related), invasive species, and the condi-
tion of community forest resources. Industrial pollution was mentioned without 
prompting in Gandaki; in this case three interviewees discussed an industrial fac-
tory that had discharged an unknown substance onto their field.  
Interviewees from all communities discussed a lack of forest resources in 
some capacity, but in Koshi resource collection was prohibited (except for one 
collection day per month) due to forest health and wildlife conflict (rhino attacks). 
In Koshi, the Nepal Army was stationed at entrances and within the forest in 
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Figure 5: Perceptions of change in Mikania abundance over the past year, by community forest.
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an attempt to prevent and protect people from rhino attacks (the Nepal Army 
only provides guards to the community forests in severe cases where the gov-
ernance committee has requested them through the buffer zone committee, who 
then contacts the national park where a request is typically placed with the district 
level government). Mikania as a problem was discussed by interviewees from 
every community forest, but only in Ghaghara and Trishuli was it perceived as a 
chief concern. In these communities Mikania was identified as directly affecting 
 livelihoods by increasing the time and distance to collect forest products. 
3.4. Mikania
All of the case study communities discussed invasive plant species and Mikania 
within their forests, but there was variation in the level of concern. As noted, 
Ghaghara and Trishuli were the most concerned about Mikania (Table 2; Tamur 
and Koshi perceived Mikania as a medium level threat and Gandaki a low level 
threat). Interviewees discussed its impact on the time it took to collect grasses, 
as well as an increase in the distance ventured into the forest to collect grasses 
not engulfed by Mikania. There was also variation in removal methods (Table 3). 
Interviewees in Trishuli and Gandaki discussed burning for Mikania manage-
ment, as well as to promote grassland growth (note in Trishuli and Gandaki the 
governance committee presidents denied burning; it can be a contentious topic as 
burning is prohibited in many communities). Cutting and pulling was mentioned 
in all communities. Only one interviewee (in Koshi) reported seeing Mikania on 
their farmland, which was very near the community forest fence. Other inter-
viewees strictly reported finding it in the forest and along the forest fence. One 
interviewee (the governance committee president of Ghaghara) reported a group 
he organizes to remove Mikania by uprooting it from within the forest and throw-
ing it all into the nearby river. 
3.5. Understanding governance relationships
The de facto governance relationships (Figure 4) are distinct from the de jure 
situation (Figure 2). Community forest members are largely isolated in  managing 
Table 2: Major problems identified in each community forest.
 Tamur Ghaghara  Trishuli  Koshi  Gandaki
Flooding  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  
Wildlife: Rhinos  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  
Wildlife: Elephants  ✓  ✓    
Wildlife: Tigers   ✓    
Wildlife: Deer and boar  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓
Mikania   ✓  ✓   
Stressed/Limited CF resources    ✓  
Industrial pollution      ✓
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Mikania. First we discuss governance relationships generally. We then consider 
interactions explicitly involving Mikania management and the implications of 
other relationships for Mikania management outcomes. All community forest 
members interviewed reported some level of interaction with the buffer zone 
committee, and many reported indirectly conveying concerns to the national park 
through buffer zone committee members. The community forest governance com-
mittee in each forest communicates with the national park and buffer zone com-
mittee about a variety of issues relevant to the community forests. We emphasize 
several key differences between the cases. 
3.5.1. Key differences in governance relationships
First, collaboration and interaction with non-governmental organizations is distinct 
in each case (non-governmental organization connections include those working 
with the communities, not only ones related to invasive plants). For instance, in 
Trishuli, non-governmental organizations are highly integrated, interacting with 
the governance committee, members, and village development committees (local 
level government). They provide resources such as toilets and wells, and in some 
cases skills-based trainings. Gandaki presents the opposite case, as they have little 
to no integration with non-governmental organizations. 
Second, the strength of the relationships between different actors and com-
munity forest members differs. For instance, community forest members in each 
case have either direct or indirect connections with the national park. However, 
the level of trust in the national park is different in each case (Figure 6). In par-
ticular, members of Tamur, Trishuli, and Koshi reported higher levels of distrust 
in the national park. Trishuli members expressed concern that park officials were 
corrupt and sequestering monetary resources that could be shared with the buf-
fer zone forests. Ghaghara members expressed lack of trust in their governance 
committee’s ability to follow through with promises, as well as distrust in park 
officials.
Finally, Gandaki is the only case study with significant ties to the district for-
est. They are not registered with the district forest, but because of their proximity 
to a highway and the district forest office, the district forest occasionally commu-
nicates with the governance committee members. 
Table 3: Presence of Mikania and removal methods.
 Tamur Ghaghara  Trishuli  Koshi  Gandaki
Mikania (presence) ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓
Burning    ✓   ✓
Cutting  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓
Pulling  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓
Pesticides  ✓     ✓
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3.5.2. Governance relationships affect information and management 
decisions 
Characteristics of governance relationships are impacting management. First, 
members in each case are making Mikania management decisions without con-
sulting their governance committees or other actors, limiting the information 
available regarding the best ways to successfully remove Mikania (Table 4). In 
some cases, community members are engaging in removal practices (such as 
burning) that increase its dispersal (Murphy et al. 2013). The content analysis 
revealed that community forests with increased numbers of negative interactions 
(e.g. a community forest member’s request to the park for monetary compen-
sation due to wildlife injury being ignored) are more likely to have members 
that report distrust and less likely to seek information about management from 
outside sources. Second, in cases where Mikania is affecting time budgets and 
daily lives, people expressed that they lacked resources or relationships that 
could improve the management situation (see the lack of ties and communica-
tion in Table 4). Additionally, interviews revealed that there were conflicting 
perspectives between actors contributing to distrust and influencing information 
availability. For example, NGO B expressed the opinion that Mikania was not 
increasing and largely failed to consider community forest members’ opinions 
regarding Mikania spread and management; this lack of communication neg-
atively impacted the relationship between the members and the organization. 
Currently, community forest interviewees report no interactions with the NGO 
as a result. 
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3.6. Collective action and governance capacity
Collective efforts to manage invasive species exist in each of the community 
forests, but to differing degrees. The income of the community forests affects 
their governance capacity; this amount differs substantially based upon political 
connections, as well as differing resources and income streams. The buffer zone 
community forests registered with the national park receive annual funds distrib-
uted through the buffer zone committee to individual governance committees; the 
total amount of money available is impacted by political conditions, which have 
dramatically changed in recent years (see Karna et al. 2010). Some governance 
committees supplement this income with tourist entry fees or selling resources 
like gravel, but their ability to engage in such activities is limited by the condition 
of the forest and their available resources, resulting in differential income oppor-
tunity, and thus governance capacity, across community forests. 
In Tamur and Ghaghara there were organized efforts to cut and pull Mikania 
within the forest directly following monsoon season for at least the past five years. 
Trishuli had “jungle cleaning” groups where specific plants were removed and 
the forest was cleaned of trash, but they were not centrally organized and were 
not necessarily targeting Mikania. Koshi and Gandaki did not participate in col-
lective efforts to remove Mikania in the past year. Koshi members previously 
attempted to cut and pull Mikania, but because forest access is currently restricted 
there, they are no longer able to organize. Gandaki members reported that their 
community forest governance committee paid individuals to pull Mikania along 
the fence, but most community members did not know this. Gandaki also hired 
people to burn Mikania (this was denied by the governance committee president), 
but there were fewer voluntary efforts.
Collective action was not tightly linked to historical governance capacity, as 
defined by income and how long the community forest officially existed. Governance 
capacity has changed in some cases based on income and resources reported from 
the governance committee presidents and field observations. Collective action 
related to Mikania removal was assessed as either high, medium, or low based on 
interviewee reports of and/or participation in such efforts (Table 5). 
Table 4: Community forest-level differences in information availability via regular communica-
tion with NGOs, Chitwan National Park (CNP), and community forest governance committees 
(CFGC).
CF members 
communicate with: 
 NGO A NGO B CNP CFGC Overall information 
availability
Tamur     ✓  Medium
Ghaghara    ✓   Medium
Trishuli     ✓  Medium
Koshi      Low 
Gandaki  ✓   ✓  ✓  High
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4. Discussion
Overall, our methodological approach provided insight into how unanticipated 
levels of institutional heterogeneity between community forests impacted the 
management of a common pool resource invaded by Mikania. In Figure 2, we 
outlined governance relationships in Chitwan community forests de jure, as they 
formally exist according to official agencies, laws, and policies. However, as our 
analysis detailed, these relationships look different on the ground. Figure 4 rep-
resents the de facto situation, with the relationships as they exist in practice. We 
discovered that formal relationships were often absent in practice, in part due to 
practical restrictions like distance (such as the lack of communication between 
most of our cases and the district forest office), but also because of broken or 
absent trust between actors. These absent or weakened relationships effectively 
isolated community members’ Mikania management efforts. The diversity of 
management behaviors across cases is significant because it highlights that the 
community forest system in Chitwan has not implemented an effective, best-prac-
tice strategy to address Mikania and sometimes continues favor practices that aid 
in Mikania’s dispersal (Murphy et al. 2013). The current strategy that is thought 
to be most effective in Mikania removal is time-consuming and involves pull-
ing the plant, immediately bagging it, and burning the bag in a hole. Thus, the 
different social and ecological conditions in the communities will still necessi-
tate varied efforts to implement the best-practice management strategy. Ostrom 
(2005) argued that institutional scholars need to understand better the factors that 
influence institutional heterogeneity, i.e. in our case, why are there differences 
in norms and strategies surrounding Mikania management efforts? Our analysis 
of the governance relationships in Chitwan revealed that they influence such dif-
ferences. Research exploring de jure institutions has made critical and important 
contributions, but it is also important to understand de facto institutions. Indeed, 
we argue that investigating both the de jure and de facto situations can create a 
richer understanding of a given case, leading to more effective solutions in natural 
resource management that are able to target management weaknesses as they exist 
in practice. Understanding the de facto institutions is important because in natu-
ral resource management efforts, particularly top-down efforts or those imple-
mented by outside actors like NGOs, false assumptions are frequently made about 
resource users, information, and relationships that exist (Leach et al. 1999). 
Table 5: The relationship between governance capacity and collective action.
 Tamur  Ghaghara  Trishuli  Koshi  Gandaki
Collective action observed in 2014  High  High  Medium  Low  Low
Governance capacity observed in 2014 High  Medium  Low  Low  High
Governance capacity assessed from 
historical data (1995–2009)
 Medium  Low  Low  High  High
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It is likely that understanding the reasons for specific management decisions and 
the relationships between actors will improve efforts to manage Mikania, as under-
standing these relationships is the first step towards strengthening them. We present 
three propositions for addressing common pool resource management, with particu-
lar relevance to resources altered by invasive species, an increasingly relevant issue 
globally (Chornesky et al. 2005). The first two focus on the importance of informa-
tion access and how institutions impact this, while the third focuses on connections 
to the natural resource. These propositions are informed by our case studies, but we 
posit that they provide transferable insight (see Lincoln and Guba 1985) to research 
with other communities facing related social-ecological challenges.
4.1. Propositions: managing invasive plants in the context of common pool 
resources
1) Communities that have more trust-based interaction with non-government 
organizations and local government actors will have increased access to 
resource management information, which is likely to increase management 
success.
Our study found that communities that interacted more frequently with NGOs 
and government actors reported greater access to information on a variety of top-
ics, including farming, construction, and education opportunities. In particular, 
communities with ties to NGO B had increased access to information about best 
practices for Mikania management and the management activities in which other 
communities had engaged. Communities that did not interact with these external 
organizations, either because they were too far from them or they did not trust 
them (Figure 6), lacked this information. In essence, these differences in relation-
ships between community forest members and non-governmental organizations 
produce information asymmetries related to Mikania management and often leave 
community forest members isolated, with fewer management options and frus-
trating, unsuccessful removal attempts. 
Connections to NGOs and other actors are often considered part of social 
capital (McCarthy 2014); these networks provide improved access to informa-
tion (Matsaganis and Wilkin 2015). Thus, strengthening the network of relation-
ships between NGOs and communities managing invasive plants is likely to 
provide information benefits. While increased knowledge does not always lead 
to increased efforts to implement this knowledge (Finger 1994), communities 
with knowledge about best practices for invasive plant removal and information 
regarding others’ efforts begin with an advantage over communities missing this 
information. Further, in communities that are already actively attempting to man-
age an invasive plant, new information may be implemented sooner. For instance, 
community forest members noted they welcomed and needed new management 
information because their current efforts frequently resulted in Mikania’s return.
Due to Nepal’s political climate (currently a very new democracy) and limited 
resources in mid-level government agencies, it is unlikely that all of the manage-
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ment-relevant relationships absent in the de facto situation could be quickly built 
or repaired. Thus, to manage Mikania, community forest members need to bolster 
bottom up collective action. While current district and national level government 
actors lack resources to significantly aid Mikania management, a combination of 
bottom up collective action and improved community relationships with actors 
such as the national park or district forest office could increase the success of bot-
tom up management efforts. Improving the frequency and quality of relationships 
between community members, NGOs, and government actors is demanding in 
practice and these relationships depend on the historical and cultural context of 
the community (Bebbington 2004). In the context of Chitwan, overcoming dis-
trust could begin with an effort from the national park and NGOs to increase the 
accessibility of their information and services (Agrawal and Gupta 2005). 
2) If resource users are struggling to manage common pool resource threats (like 
invasive species), an absence of valuable management information due to lack 
of trust between resource users and actors at different scales is potentially a 
contributing factor and a useful diagnostic starting point.
When resource users are struggling to confront threats to their common pool 
resource, where can stakeholders begin to address the issue? First, stakeholders 
can begin by confirming that the threat to the resource is an important issue to 
the local resource users. In our case, we discovered that Mikania is perceived as 
increasing in all of the community forest groups (Figure 5) and that it is viewed as 
a key problem in some cases (Table 2).
Interviews indicated that the initiative to collectively manage Mikania was 
present, but that community members’ current efforts had largely been frustrat-
ing and unsuccessful, as Mikania typically returned. Additionally, we discovered 
that distrust inhibited access to relevant management information and resources 
(Figure 6). Our analysis highlighted the importance of understanding the on the 
ground situation, as opposed to exclusively studying the de jure situation, as many 
of the relationships present in the de jure situation were absent or weakened in 
part due to trust issues.
Further, our systematic analysis of interview data lends scientific support to the 
importance of unpacking trust in common pool resource management, showing 
that trust can influence heterogeneity in efforts to collectively manage common 
pool resources. Community forest members’ lack of trust between the national park 
and/or their governance committee resulted in isolation, where members managed 
Mikania alone or opted out of management entirely. The precise definition of 
trust is contentious in literature from a variety of scholarly fields (Heemskerk 
et al. 2015). Here, trust refers to whether a partner organization or individual can 
be depended upon, whether they respect the interests of others, and if they are 
competent in acting upon their agreements (Dirks 1999; Heemskerk et al. 2015). 
Trust is difficult to quantify and when resource users and managers possess dif-
ferent levels of power, distrust among actors can result when power is abused 
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(Dhiaulhaq et al. 2015). Trust has been found to be central in natural resource 
management contexts generally, but is not as frequently explored in the context of 
common pool resources. For example, along with boundary spanning leadership 
(leadership that connects actors at different levels and of different types), trust 
has been shown to be vital in successful water management (Edelenbos and van 
Meerkerk 2015). There are numerous studies exploring techniques to build trust. 
Berkes (2009) discussed the importance of trust in implementing successful co-
management of natural resources and elaborated the vital role that bridging orga-
nizations play in cultivating trust between stakeholders. It has also been found 
that strong leaders (Folke et al. 2005), social learning processes (Henly-Shepard 
et al. 2015), and the participation of stakeholders can improve stakeholder trust in 
natural resource management (Reed 2008). In order to strengthen the fairness and 
effectiveness of natural resources management, it is important both for govern-
ments to reach out to local resource users to nurture trust and for local resource 
users to reciprocate such efforts (Heemskerk et al. 2015).
There are fewer examples exploring what happens when trust is entirely 
lacking in governance relationships and how this influences the social-ecolog-
ical system. One notable example is Heemskerk et al. (2015), who found that 
distrust among actors was detrimental in the management of mineral resources 
in Suriname, where distrust actively impacted natural resource policies and out-
comes. Distrust is not only important in shaping policy perceptions but also pro-
hibits communication and information flow among resource users, inhibiting 
effective natural resource management (Bodin et al. 2006).
Trust is important in shaping institutions on the ground, including how insti-
tutions are upheld and interpreted. An essential finding is that trust is sometimes 
deficient between community forest members and their own governance com-
mittees (Figure 6). This is important because these committees are not typically 
viewed as “outsiders,” imposing rules and practices that are viewed as insensitive 
towards the community they are intended to serve. Instead these management 
committees have in the past been viewed as working for households and integral 
to sustainable resource governance. This distrust could in part be a reflection 
of the lack of ethnic diversity in management committees (committee members 
primarily belong to the higher socio-economic status Brahmin/Chhetri ethnic-
ity, whereas communities are more diverse). Our current study cannot discern 
the precise factors promoting distrust between members and governance com-
mittees, but it is an important area for future research. Davenport et al. (2006) 
studied natural resource management and trust in communities located near the 
Midewin Tallgrass National Prairie in Illinois, United States and detailed the 
critical importance of trust between the local community and the Forest Service 
(responsible for the prairie’s administration) in effective management. Although 
the local communities were not utilizing the prairie for resource extraction, but 
recreation, the study underscores the importance of identifying and encourag-
ing trust between resource users and the local resource managers for long term 
success. 
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In Chitwan, members reported less communication with participants they did 
not trust, which impacted Mikania management information (Figures 4 and 6, 
Table 4). Well defined institutions in the forms of norms and cognitive structures 
can strengthen and engender interpersonal trust, as well as trust among differ-
ent actors and organizations (Fuglsang and Jagd 2015). Importantly, both propo-
sitions 1 and 2 argue that institutional norms and relationships are influencing 
information, and that information matters for successful common pool resource 
management. By articulating differences in governance relationships and man-
agement norms, the reasons for differences in information access become clearer 
and can be addressed to improve management efforts. 
3) Specific to community forests: Community forests that provide more resources 
to members will exhibit greater potential to collectively manage invasive 
plants and resources due to greater buy-in/reliance on forest resources.
The relationship between governance capacity and collective action is not entirely 
clear from the literature. Collective action has played a vital role common pool 
resource management in numerous global contexts (Agrawal 2001; Agrawal 
2003; Ostrom 2005, 200) and our research supports that people are more likely to 
engage in collective action for Mikania management when they are more reliant 
on the community forest resources. Monetary and social resources have a positive 
relationship with governance capacity, and as this capacity increases, people may 
have greater access to a collectively managed resource and incentive to orga-
nize to manage it (Coaffee and Healey 2003). Governance capacity and collec-
tive action for Mikania management were closely linked in Tamur and Koshi, 
moderately linked in Ghaghara and Trishuli, and not closely linked in Gandaki 
(Table 5). Supporting our proposition, in Koshi, the condition of the forest is very 
poor, the governance committee has little resources, and the members are forced 
to rely less on these resources. In turn, members reported being less invested in 
maintaining the forest and organizing for Mikania management. In Tamur, the 
condition of the forest is better, the governance committee has more income, and 
members have greater access to fodder collection and fuel wood resources. These 
members reported annual instances of collective action to both clean the commu-
nity forest of trash and manage Mikania. Gandaki, the urban community in our 
study, represents a caveat to part of our proposition. This community forest has 
a high governance capacity, but a very low level of collective action for Mikania 
management. This deviation is likely due in part to Gandaki’s urban location; it 
has very close proximity to a city and a highway. Thus, despite the governance 
committee’s capacity to maintain the community forest and provide members 
with access to its resources, the members are less dependent on forest resources 
as they have a variety of livelihood opportunities available in the nearby city.  
The perception that Mikania is increasing in all cases (Figure 5), combined 
with identification of Mikania as a major problem in two cases (Table 2), is an 
indication that people are aware of and frustrated by its impact on their forest 
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resources. External factors related to the differential income potential available 
to each governance committee influence a committee’s ability to enhance gov-
ernance capacity. Committees with fewer monetary resources could begin to 
enhance the quality of the resource, and the value members receive from member-
ship, by seeking and sharing information on Mikania management best practices. 
Members that are more reliant on the resources and best able to utilize them are 
the most likely to participate in collective action to maintain them (Lise 2000). 
Thus, this may increase collective action potential, reduce Mikania, and simulta-
neously have benefits for members.
Through elucidation of the de facto institutions involved in collective efforts to 
manage Mikania, these propositions are a useful starting point for understanding 
how institutions mediate collective action problems involving social-ecological 
challenges such as invasive species. Understanding institutions is vital to success-
ful common pool resource management (Tang 1991; Ostrom et al. 1994; Becker 
and Ostrom 1995) and a focus on the de facto situation can potentially aid com-
munity members and other stakeholders in designing systems to address issues 
that prohibit successful management such as lack of trust and information barriers. 
5. Conclusion
While institutional research has stressed that there are no one-size-fits-all solu-
tions (Ostrom 2007), our approach can be employed to understand de facto gov-
ernance relationships in any region to inform management plans that address 
context specific findings. The propositions presented in this article provide stake-
holders a generalizable starting point for addressing institutions and relationships 
that impact invasive plant management and common pool resource management 
generally. 
This study contributes knowledge relevant to our Chitwan case study partici-
pants, as well contributing more broadly to an understanding of the complexities 
involved in managing invasive plants and other disruptive events that threaten 
social-ecological systems, an increasingly relevant global concern (Chornesky 
et al. 2005). It is our hope that in the context of Chitwan, this detailed understand-
ing of governance relationships and norms related to management as they exist on 
the ground will support successful efforts to manage Mikania and other invasive 
plants. Our key recommendations from this study related to institutional design 
are to foster norms of trust between actors and implement well-defined manage-
ment rules. The former has the potential to improve the flow of information per-
tinent to management decisions (Levin and Cross 2004), while the latter has been 
shown to improve resource management in many cases (Anderies et al. 2004). 
One potential way to advance trust and strengthen relationships between resource 
users and other actors in our case study and beyond is for government actors to 
address problems viewed as critical by resource users (e.g. in Chitwan, wildlife 
attacks and flooding). Addressing issues that immediately threaten resource users’ 
daily experiences may augment community trust in government actors and bolster 
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community efforts to manage invasive species, through freed time and expanded 
information access, improving the quality of their lives in multiple ways. 
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